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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This document reports on the first phase of the research entitled “Homeland Security Research 
And Technology Proposal (Optimizing Electric Grid Design Under Asymmetric Threat),” which 
is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs and Office of 
Domestic Preparedness (2002-GT-R-057).  
 
This research begins an effort, spanning several years, aimed at developing new optimization 
models and methods for planning expansion and enhancements of electrical power grids that 
improve robustness to potential disruptions caused by natural disasters, sabotage and, especially, 
terrorist attacks.  The research reported here enables identification of critical grid components 
(which may include transmission lines, generators, transformers, and other power system 
elements) by identifying maximally disruptive, coordinated, terrorist attacks on an electrical 
power grid.  We report results obtained using our techniques on standard, reliability-benchmark, 
test networks. 
 
The document is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of the project’s objectives.  
Section 3 describes our approach to the problem, including the mathematical formulation of 
models and outlines of algorithms.  Section 4 reports preliminary results of our models and 
methods applied to two medium-size power grids which are standard test-bed examples.  Section 
5 summarizes the value of this research with respect to the original call for proposals.  Finally, 
Section 6 explains future goals and proposes extensions of this research. 
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 2. OBJECTIVE 
 
The United States’ electrical power system is critical to the country’s economy and security.  The 
system’s vulnerability to natural disasters or physical attacks has been recognized, but this 
vulnerability has been increasing in recent years because:  (a) Infrastructure has not expanded as 
quickly as demand has, thereby reducing the “cushion” available when system components fail, 
and (b) the probability of terrorist attacks has increased.  Our project develops new mathematical 
models and optimization methods for robust planning of electrical power grids, focusing on 
security and reliability with special emphasis on potential disruptions caused by terrorist attacks.  
As an incentive to spend the money necessary to make electric power grids more robust, we  also 
want to demonstrate secondary economic benefits. 
 
We refer to our proposal [Salmeron and Wood 2002] and references therein for detailed 
background on the problem of electric power-grid vulnerability.  In that document, we establish 
short- and long-term goals for this research and its critical importance.  The key motivation is: 
“The nation’s electric power systems must clearly be made more resilient to terrorist attack” 
[Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism 2002]. 
 
In this initial research on the problem, we develop models and algorithms that can identify sets of 
system components whose proper functioning is key to meeting demand for electrical power.  We 
focus on optimal interdiction, i.e., attack, of electric power grids, subject to limited interdiction 
resources.  “Optimality” implies that the attack causes the largest possible disruption; “limited 
resources’’ implies a set of combined attacks on system components that terrorists might 
reasonably carry out simultaneously.  By studying how to attack power grids, we will ultimately 
understand how to protect them.  By considering the largest disruptions that might be caused by a 
coordinated set of attacks, our proposed protection plans will be appropriately conservative.  The 
discussion emphasizes terrorist attacks, but our techniques are also applicable to improving the 





We have developed a preliminary interdiction model and an algorithm to solve the problem 
approximately.  The interdiction model is a max-min (Mm) problem:  
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For a given interdiction plan δ , the inner problem is a power-flow model that minimizes 
generation costs plus the penalty associated with unmet demand, together denoted by cy.  Here, y 
represents generation outputs, phase angles and power flows, as well as unmet demand, i.e., the 
amount of “load shed.”  The outer maximization attempts choose the most disruptive, resource-
constrained interdiction plan δ ∈ ∆ , where ∆  is a discrete set.  In this model, f will correspond to 
a set of functions that are nonlinear in ( , )y δ .  In our preliminary DC model of the inner problem, 
f(y) (i.e., ˆ)( ,f y δ  for a given fixed δˆ ), is, however, linear in y.  However, when all the features 
of a power-flow model such as reactive power flows and losses are considered, f(y) becomes 
nonlinear even for a fixed δˆ .  
 
At futures stages of our research (see Section 6) we will investigate: 
Linear approximations of the (Mm) problem, (L-Mm) that have the form: • 
 













which are amenable to exact decomposition methods, 
 
Extensions of the (Mm) and (LMm) models to consider system restoration and 




And, extensions of the (Mm) and (LMm) models to incorporate protective measures 
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where the new, third level of optimization over p P∈  represents protective 
measures to be taken in advance. These measures will influence the ability of 
terrorist to attack the grid via ( )pδ ∈ ∆ , and the subsequent power flows. 
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 The mathematical modeling and algorithmic details of our research to date are explained in the 
remainder of this section.  We first introduce our DC approximation of the power-flow model., 
and then present the formulation of the interdiction model.  Finally, we introduce the algorithm 
we use for approximate solution of the combined power-flow/interdiction model.  
 
3.1 Power-flow model 
 
Our present implementation of a basic power-flow model is simplified to the so-called DC 
representation of the full AC model, which neglects reactive power effects.  This entails various 
assumptions, many of which may be acceptable in the context of security analysis [e.g., Wood 
and Wollenberg 1996].  This model, hereafter called DC-OPF (DC-Optimal Power Flow), is 
specified below.  The objective is to generate and distribute energy at minimum cost while 
simultaneously meeting demand as best possible, at a single instant of time.  We later consider a 
time-phased model that considers the changing state of the network over time after an attack, and 
accumulates the penalty associated with unserved demand over time.  In the eventual max-min 
interdiction model, the right-hand sides of the model’s constraints will be modified through a set 
of interdiction variables. 
 
Index sets and indices: 
I    set of buses ( denote bus indices) ,i k
iG   set of generators at bus i  ( denotes a generator) g
L   set of lines ( l denotes a line) 
iL   set of lines connected to bus i  
C   set of consumer sectors ( c  denotes a consumer sector) 
S   set of substations (  denotes a consumer sector) s
sI   set of buses at substation  s
sL   set of lines at substation  (including transformers and lines connected to the 
substation) 
s
(Remark: In this model, transformers can be represented by lines) 
 
Parameters: 
( ), ( )o l d l  origin and destination buses of line l L∈ . Remark: More than one line with the 
same  may exist.  ( ), ( )o l d l
( )i g  bus for generator , i.e., g ( )i gg G∈  
i cd   load demand of consumer sector  at bus i  c
Line
lP  maximum flow (i.e., transmission capacity) on line l L∈  
, ,,
Gen Gen
i g i gP P  min and max power output from generator  at bus i , where  g ig G∈
lr   line resistance for  l L∈   
lx   line reactance for l L∈  (we assume l lx r ).  




= +  
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 ( )icf ⋅  load shedding cost function for customer sector  at bus , e.g., for a segment 
set , take 
c i
{1,2,3}H = ( )ic i c h h
h





0≥ i c hhs α  are  the incremental shedding cost rates.  
,(
Gen





i gP  generation from generator  at bus i , where g ig G∈  
Line
lP  power flow on line l L∈  
i cS   load shedding of customer sector c  at bus i  
iθ   phase angle at bus i  
 
Formulation of DC-OPF:  
  ,  ,
, , ,
( , )






P P S i g G i c
F P S






        subject to: 
     ( ) ( )(
Line
l l o l d lP B θ θ= − ), l L∀ ∈   (DC.1)  
     (DC.2) ,




i g l l i c i c
g G l o l i l d l i c
P P P d
∈ = =
− + = −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ )S , i∀
   ,Line Line Linel l lP P P− ≤ ≤    l L∀ ∈   (DC.3) 
   , , , ,
Gen Gen Gen
i g i g i gP P P≤ ≤    , ii g G∀ ∀ ∈   (DC.4) 
       0 i c i cS d≤ ≤ , ,i c∀    (DC.5) 
 
DC-OPF minimizes generation plus shedding costs (penalties) in the objective function.  
Constraints (DC.1) approximate active power flows on the lines.  Current-balance constraints at 
the buses are established in (DC.2).  Constraints (DC.3) and (DC.4) set maximum line power 
flows and maximum and minimum outputs from each generating unit.  (DC.5) states that the load 
shedding cannot exceed demand.  
 
3.2 Interdiction model 
 
The interdictor in our model, i.e., a group of terrorists, will make a coordinated set of resource-
constrained interdictions (attacks) on the power grid.  We make the following assumptions on the 
effect of each potential interdiction: 
 
• Line interdiction: All lines running physically in parallel at the point of an attack are 
opened.  (Typically, these lines are mounted on the same towers, and an attack on any 
one is an attack on all.) 
• Transformer interdiction:  When a transformer is attacked, the line representing the 
transformer is opened. 
• Generator interdiction: When a generator is attacked, the generator is disconnected from 
the grid.  
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 • Bus interdiction: When a bus is attacked, all the lines connected to the bus are opened, 
which in turn disconnects all generation from the bus and all loads connected to the bus. 
• Substation interdiction: When a substation is interdicted, all the buses at the substation 
are disconnected, triggering other indirect effects. 
 
 
Additional sets required: 
*
i iG G⊆ , , *L L⊆ *I I⊆ , : set of interdictable generators at bus i ,  lines,  buses, 
and substations, respectively 
*S ⊆ S
 
Additional parameters required: 
,
Gen












: amount of resource required to interdict 
generator  at bus , line l*ig G∈ *L∈ ,  bus *i I∈  and substation , 
respectively. 
*s S∈




i gδ , Linelδ , Busiδ , Subsδ : binary variable that takes the value 1 if generator ,  line 
, bus i  and substation 
*
ig G∈
*Ll ∈ *I∈ *s S∈ , respectively, is interdicted, and is 0 
otherwise      
Formulation of I-DC-OPF:  
  
, , ,
max ( , , , )
Gen Line Bus Sub
Gen Line Bus SubG
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
 subject to: 
    
 
* * * *
, ,
i
Gen Gen Line Line Bus Bus Sub Sub
i g i g l l i i s s
i I g G l L i I s S
M M M Mδ δ δ δ
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
+ + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ M≤  (I.1) 
  , {0,1},
Gen
i gδ ∈ {0,1},Linelδ ∈ {0,1},Busiδ ∈ {0,1},Subsδ ∈ interdictableelements∀  (I.2) 
 








Gen Line Bus Sub Gen )g ic




δ δ δ δ
∈
= +P f S∑ ∑ ∑∑
	

             (IDC.0) 
  subject to: 
    (IDC.1)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
|
(1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 ) ( ),
s
Line Line Bus Bus Sub
l l o l d l s l o l d l
s l L
P Bδ δ δ δ θ θ
∈
 = − − − − −   ∏ l L∀ ∈
 
  ,




i g l l i c i c
g G l o l i l d l i c
P P P d
∈ = =
− + = −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ )S , i∀         (IDC.2) 
 
 (1 ) (1 ),Line Line Line Line Linel l l l lP P Pδ δ− − ≤ ≤ −    l L∀ ∈             (IDC.3) 
 
 ( ) , , , ( ) , ,(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) ,
Bus Gen Gen Gen Bus Gen Gen
i g i g i g i g i g i g i gP P Pδ δ δ δ− − ≤ ≤ − −  , ii g G∀ ∀ ∈    (IDC.4) 
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       0 i c i cS d≤ ≤ , ,i c∀             (IDC.5)  
 
The solution to I-DC-OPF maximizes disruption.  Disruption is evaluated through the inner 
minimization problem that consists of a power-flow model like DC-OPF, but from which we 
have removed all the interdicted elements beforehand.  At the upper level, (I.1) reflects the 
terrorists’ options to interdict different combinations of elements in the network without 
exceeding their resources.  (More complicated interdiction-resource constraints, or logical 
constraints on interdiction, are straightforward to incorporate.)  (I.2) defines each individual 
terrorist option as a binary variable. 
 
Equations (IDC.1)-(IDC.5) are analogs (DC.1)-(DC.5).  Here, however, the elements that have 
been (directly or indirectly) interdicted are removed from the equations through the binary 
interdiction variables.  For example, if a line l is connected to an interdicted substation s (that is, 
 ) then (IDC.1) for line l  becomes: 1Subsδ = 0LinelP = . 
 
The computational difficulty of the I-DC-OPF model stems from the max-min structure of the 
problem.  (Constraints (IDC.4) can be linearized and do not present a problem.) The inner 
minimization is over a polytope that depends on δ .  Solution of the inner minimization problem 
as a linearized function of δ  yields a function that is convex in δ .  Consequently, the outer 
maximization is over a convex function, which (as usual) is computationally difficult. 
 
3.3 Interdiction algorithm 
 
Future research will investigate the conversion of I-DC-OPF to a linear mixed-integer program 
which could be solved directly or through decomposition [Cormican et al. 1998].  At this 
juncture, we have devised a decomposition-based heuristic approach to obtain good (for the 
terrorist) interdiction plans, but not necessarily optimal ones.  The heuristic is outlined in Figure 
1, and details follow.  
 
 
igure 1: Interdiction algorithm framework F
 Maximize the Value of the Assets 
to be Interdicted (excluding 
previously explored solutions) 
Solve the DC-OPF for the present 
grid configuration 
Based on present and previous flow 
patterns, assign a “Value” to each 
interdictable asset 
 
We begin by solving DC-OPF assuming no attacks.  The result is an optimal power flow for 
normal operations, a flow that typically minimizes generation costs without shedding any load.  
The power-flow pattern is used to assign relative values (see below) to all the components of the 
power grid: generators, lines (and transformers represented by lines), buses and substations.  
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 Then, we maximize the estimated value of the assets to be interdicted while ensuring that the 
resources required for the interdiction plan are not exceeded.  With this plan, we modify the right-
hand side of DC-OPF model and obtain its solution.  The result is a power flow that again 
minimizes generation costs plus the penalty associated with load shedding:  It is likely in this case 
the some load will indeed be shed since valuable assets (e.g., substations that were distributing 
electricity) have been removed from the grid.  
 
The process continues by finding alternative sets of valuable assets to interdict that have not been 
identified at earlier iterations, and by evaluating load shedding for each of these interdiction 
plans.  This algorithm may be viewed as a heuristic version of Benders decomposition [Geoffrion 
1972] to solve the bilevel program (I-DC-OPF).  This decomposition incorporates super-valid 
inequalities to eliminate previously generated solutions [Israeli and Wood 2002]. 
 
We next provide details of the two models required in the heuristic decomposition: 
 
Subproblem: DC-OPF for a specific interdiction plan 
 
Assume that at iteration t of our algorithm, a specific interdiction plan 
 is given; the superscript t is an iteration counter.  The 
associated power-flow model 
, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , ,t Gen t Line t Bus t Subδ δ δ δ δ= , )t
ˆDC-OPF( )tδ , from equations (IDC.0)-(IDC.5), is the 
“subproblem” and its solution yields objective value G  along with 
power flows, generation and unmet demand that are represented by 
, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , ,Gen t Line t Bus t Sub tδ δ δ δ
ˆ ˆ( , ,t Line tP P
, )
)t, , ˆ ˆˆ ,Gen t tP S θ= .  




The solution , , ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( , , ,t Line t Gen t tP P P S )tθ=   provided by subproblem ˆDC-OPF( )tδ  serves to 
construct a list of uninterdicted elements in the power grid that is ordered in terms of “estimated 
attractiveness” for further interdiction.  To determine the individual importance of each asset, we 
define a set of parameters which will represent, essentially, estimated coefficients for a “Benders 
cut” that will be added to the master problem.  (In this heuristic, the “cut” is added to the master-
problem objective rather than being added as a constraint; the super-valid inequalities give us the 
“cuts” that build up from iteration to iteration.)  These parameters are:   
 
, ,





Into t Line t Line t
i l




∧ > ∧ <
= +∑ ∑ ,lˆP  (total flow into bus i) 
, ,





Out t Line t Line t
i l




∧ < ∧ >
= +∑ ∑ ,lˆP
icS
 (total flow out of bus i) 
, ˆ  ( )Met t ti ic
c
F d= −∑  (total demand met at bus i) 
 
,ˆGen Gen Gen t




'|( , ')are 
in parallel
ˆ| | | |Line t Line Line t Line tl l
l l l
V w P P




 (value of line l) 










= ∑  (value of substation s) 
 
In these assignments, parameters  and  are given as input data to reflect 
preliminary estimates of value for each type of asset.  By default, all of them can be set to one.  
However, computational experience indicates that the algorithm is more efficient when using 
values that provide higher incentives for attacks on buses and whole substations versus individual 
lines and generators, for example, 
, ,Gen Bus Linew w w
2,Gen Busw w
Subw





An extended definition of value (that we have also exercised in our computations) incorporates 
the following two enhancements: 
The first modification divides the above-defined value of a given component (given 
in MW) by the amount of interdiction resources required to interdict it.  The idea is 
to factor in not only the power flow that a specific asset supports, but also its relative 
importance with respect to the required resources to attack it.  This value is given in 
MW/resource units. 
The second modification takes note that every time an asset is interdicted, the power 
flow through it is null.  As a consequence, the asset does not appear as an attractive 
target at the (immediately) following iteration.  To overcome this mismatch, we 
define the “cumulative value” of a specific asset as the average value of the asset 
throughout the iterations of the algorithm in which the asset was not interdicted.  
This, in turn, allows us to integrate all the iterations (instead of the last one only) 
into the value concept. 
 






















'| ' '|( , ')are 
ˆ in parallel0




Line t Line t Line t
l lLine






  = +   

























Sub t Line t
s lSub






= ∑ ∑ ,  (value of substation s) 
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 Remark: For the purpose of calculations, if an indirect interdiction occurs (e.g., a line is not 
attacked but it is connected to an interdicted bus), we assume in the computations above, that all 
δˆ  variables related to the attacked asset and to all the indirectly attacked assets are set to one.  
 
Master Problem: Finding the most valuable interdiction 
 
Let us assume that a set of estimated values for each element of the grid, 
, has been calculated at iteration t.  Let us also define the vector 
of previously generated interdiction plans,
( , , ,, , ,t Gen t Line t Bus t Sub tg l i sV V V V V= ),
1t1ˆ ˆˆ ( ,..., )t δ δ −∆ = . The interdiction master problem is 
then: 
 










* * * *
, ,




Gen t Gen t Line t Line t Gen t Gen t Sub t Sub t
g i g l l i i s s
i I g G l L i I s S
V V V Vδ δ δ
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
+ + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ,δ
 
 subject to: 
 
 
* * * *
, , , , , , ,
, ,
i
Gen Gen t Line t Line t Bus t Bus t Sub t Sub t
i g i g l l i i s s
i I g G l L i I s S
M M M Mδ δ δ δ
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈





i gδ ∈ , {0,1},Line tlδ ∈ , {0,1},Bus tiδ ∈ , {0,1},Sub tsδ ∈
      interdictableelements∀   (MP.2) 
  
       (MP.3) , , *, 1, ,
Gen t Bus t
i g i ig G i Iδ δ+ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈
, , *1, ,Line t Bus tl i il L L i Iδ δ+ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∩ ∀ ∈      (MP.4) 
, , *
' 1, , ' | , ' in parallel
Line t Line t
l l l l L l lδ δ+ ≤ ∀ ∈      (MP.5) 
, , *1, ,Bus t Sub ti s si I I s Sδ δ+ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∩ ∀ ∈      (MP.6) 
, , *1, ,Line t Sub tl s sl L L s Sδ δ+ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∩ ∀ ∈      (MP.7) 
* * * *
, ' , ' , ', '
,
* * *
, ' , ', '
,
, , , ,
,
| | | |
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ 1 1 11






Line t Bus t Sub tGen t
i si g l
i
Line t Bus tGen t
ii g l
Gen t Line t Bus t Sub t
i g l i s
i I g G l L i I s S
Gen t Line t Bus t
i g l i
i I g G l L i I
δ δ δδ
δ δδ
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
= = ==
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
= ==
+ + + ≤
+ +


















+ − ∀ <∑ ∑  (MP.8) 
 
The objective function of ˆMP( , )t tV ∆  attempts to maximize our estimated value of interdicted 
resources.  
 
Constraints (MP.1) and (MP.2) are analogous to (I.1) and (I.2) in the I-DC-OPF model.  
 
(MP.3) through (MP.7) serve the following purposes, respectively: Interdict a generator or the bus 
that it is connected to, but not both; interdict a line or the bus that it is connected to, but not both; 
if in parallel, interdict one line or another, but not both; interdict a bus or the substation that it 
belongs to, but not both; and, interdict a line or the substation that it is connected to, but not both.  
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 Of course, the reason for this exclusion is that the objective function treats the different elements 
as individual items with their own value (disregarding that an interdiction may trigger other 
indirect interdictions).  Thus, these constraints avoid unnecessary use of resources to destroy 
elements of the grid that have been effectively interdicted as a consequence of other interdictions.  
 
Finally, (MP.8) ensures that the interdiction plan chosen at the incumbent iteration is different 
from any other plan from previous iterations.  This equation is a little more restrictive than the 
following alternative: 
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At iteration t, (MP.8-II) deems feasible an attack consisting of all of the attacked elements at a 
previous iteration t′ plus new elements.  (MP.8) assumes that no superset of a set of once-
interdicted elements will ever be interdicted, because we believe the master problem will 
typically consume all available resource in finding a set of elements to interdict, and no superset 
can therefore be feasible.  Only (MP.8) has been tested at this time. 
 
The solution to  is denoted  and it is used in the 
subproblem to start a new iteration of the algorithm.  The algorithm is described next. 
ˆMP( , )t tV ∆ , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , ,t Gen t Line t Bus t Subδ δ δ δ δ=
 
I-ALG: Interdiction Algorithm 
 
Input data: 
 Problem data (grid data, interdiction data) 
 T (maximum number of iterations) 
 
Initialization: 
 Set 0t =  (iteration counter) and . 0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , , ) (0,0,0,0)Gen Line Bus Subδ δ δ δ δ= =
 Set ˆ* ˆδ δ=  and  (best interdiction plan so-far) *(DC-OPF)=0υ
 
Subproblem: 
Solve ˆDC-OPF( )tδ . Denote its objective function value by 
ˆ( ( t ))DC OPFυ δ− .  
If  , assign *ˆ( ( ))> (tDC OPF DC OPFυ δ υ− −
*(DC-OPF) ( (DC OPF
)
ˆ ))tυ υ δ← −  and *ˆ ˆtδ δ← . 
 
Assign t t . If  , STOP. 1← + t T>
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 Master problem: 
Calculate the vector of estimated values, V , and update . t 1 1ˆ ˆˆ ( ,..., )t tδ δ −∆ =
Solve .   ˆMP( , )t tV ∆
  If  MP t  is infeasible, STOP.  Otherwise, return to Subproblem. ˆ( , )tV ∆
 
 Output:  
The resulting *δˆ is a feasible interdiction plan with associated cost .  If 
the algorithm exits at the master problem step (i.e.,  is infeasible), it 
means that all the feasible solutions have been enumerated, and 
*(SP)υ
ˆMP( , )t tV ∆









We have applied the I-ALG algorithm developed in this research to two test networks drawn 
from the 1996 reliability test system (RTS) [IEEE Reliability Test Data, 1999-I, 1999-II].   
 
Tests are carried out on a 1 GHz desktop PC with 1GB of RAM.  The I-ALG algorithm is 
implemented using GAMS [2003].  The subproblems and master problems are solved using 
CPLEX [GAMS-CPLEX 2003]. 
 
We set a limited number of iterations, T 500= , because the computational complexity of the 
master problem increases as the number of iterations grows (the number of constraints in (MP.8) 
increases by one at every iteration).  In fact, computational experience shows that little 
improvement in solution quality is achieved after 100 iterations, with the best solution-quality 
versus time tradeoff occurring between 50 and 100 iterations.  
 
4.2 Test case description 
 
The RTS examples are not intended to represent a particular system but, rather, a general 
reference grid that contains (to a certain extent) the different technologies and configurations that 
exist in any power grid.  Figures 2 and 3 represent the RTS-One Area, whereas Figure 4 is the 
RTS-Two Areas, which merges two areas by incorporating three interconnections. 
 
Labels next to lines and buses are just for the purpose of identifying elements as they appear in 
IEEE Reliability Test Data [1999-I, 1999-II], where more specific details can be consulted.  The 
figures inside the circles indicate the number of generation units at the bus and their maximum 
output.  (Figure 5 shows only the aggregated output.)  Next to each arrow we specify the total 
load at the corresponding bus.  
 
In addition to grid data, we assume that terrorists have limited resources to simultaneously 
interdict multiple elements of the grid, and that these terrorists will complete their actions 
successfully.  For simplicity of exposition, suppose that the terrorists’ resources can be quantified 
as six people (for RTS One-Area) and twelve people (for RTS Two-Areas), and that one person is 
required to attack any line (except buried cable lines, that cannot be interdicted, and lines 
representing transformers that require two people), two people can attack an individual generator, 
and three people can attack any bus or substation (including the large substation in the middle of 
the figure).  In general, the concept of terrorist “resources” can accommodate the available 
information from intelligence sources, whether it is specific as in this example, or generic, such as 
“any three attacks might happen.”  Also, for simplicity, we measure the effect of a set of attacks 
through the total load (demand for electricity) that must be shed (left unmet); if this load were not 
shed at the operation control level, cascading outages and a complete system blackout could 
occur.   
 
4.3 Interdiction plans 
 
Our algorithm finds many attack plans for RTS-One Area, from which we choose the following 
two to look at more closely: “Plan A” (Figure 2) attacks the substation and three selected lines, 
shedding 1,258 MW (44.1% of the total load), and “Plan B” (Figure 3) attacks six selected 
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 transmission lines, shedding 1,373 MW (48.2%).  Plan B sheds more instantaneous load than 
Plan A, but we must estimate the total amount of unsupplied energy while the effects of the attack 
last.  Our algorithm I-ALG does not take this aspect into consideration yet. Doing so entails 
establishing time lines, or “time regimes,” for repair, and evaluating the resulting load-shedding 
patterns and their cost, over time.  In our example, the 115 MW of additional “short-term” load 
shedding in Plan B may be negligible when compared to the long-term disruption caused by 
destroying the four transformers in the large substation, which presumably could not be replaced 
or repaired quickly. 
 
Figure 4 depicts results for the RTS-Two Areas test problem.  Note that 2,516 MW (44.1%) of 
load is shed.  This means that the terrorists can interdict a bit less than twice as much power by 
using twice as many terrorists in a grid that is “twice as big” as the original.  The three 






















































































































Figure 2. IEEE RTS-One Area (Plan A). Total Load: 2,850 MW. Resources: Six
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Figure 3. IEEE RTS-One Area  (Plan B). Total Load: 2,850 MW. Resources: Six terr




















































































































































































































Figure 4. IEEE RTS (Two Areas). Total Load: 5,700 MW. Resources: 12 terrorists. Load Shedding: 2,516 MW.
  
Figure 5 shows the amount of load shed in each grid when interdiction resources vary from zero to forty 
terrorists.  As expected, the amount of load shed is a monotonically non-decreasing function of the 
number of terrorists.  Actually, that this expected result does occur lends credence to the accuracy of our 
optimization algorithm:  If the heuristic were poor, we would expect to see the load shed to drop 
occasionally with increased interdiction resources. 
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Total load (5,700 MW)
One Area x2 with half res.
 
Figure 5-A: Load shedding for RTS-One Area by 
number of terrorists. Total load is 2,850 MW. 
Figure 5-B: Load shedding for RTS-Two Areas 
by number of terrorists. Total load is 5,700 MW. 
The results is also compared to twice the load 
shed in the One-Area case using half the number 
of terrorists. 
Figure 5. RTS-One Area and RTS-Two Areas. Load shedding for different interdiction resources 
 
In the One-Area case we observe that using 28 terrorists or more results in at least 90% of the total load 
being shed (Figure 5-A).  For the most part, the Two-Areas case (Figure 5-B) is more difficult to interdict 
when compared to the One-Area case for twice the amount of interdiction resource.  For example, we can 
shed 2,311MW in the One-Area case using 20 terrorists, whereas only 4,000 MW can be shed in the Two-
Area case using 40 terrorists.  In this sense, the interconnection lines play an important role in decreasing 
the impact of the attacks.  However, we observe the opposite effect if the number of terrorist is small.  In 
this case, there is little damage that, for example, two terrorists can cause in the One-Area case.  
However, in comparison, four terrorists may cause more damage in the Two-Areas case because they can 
still focus on the weak links of a single area 
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 5. VALUE OF THE RESEARCH TO HOMELAND SECURITY 
 
The call for proposals that this research addresses, asks how our research adds value to the 
Homeland Security effort.  We respond as follows: 
 
 Simulation software for HLS: 
- Attacks on critical infrastructure: Power Grids 
 
 Deliverables (this document): 
- Models and algorithms (as presented) 
- Case studies (as presented) 
- Software (under development) 
- Publications (future work) 
 
By criterion used to fund the project: 
- This research addresses an important problem in HLS 
- This research adds to the body of HLS knowledge 
- This research is interdisciplinary 
- This research is novel and useful 
- This research invites non-NPS collaborators 
- PIs have a reputation in the proposed field of study 
- PIs will try to get students involved in this research and produce theses 
- Results will be publishable 
- Results will be useful in teaching HLS courses 








Many technical and functional issues remain for future work, and they include: 
  
A) Modeling:  Power restoration over time will be modeled, along with short-term and long-term 
economic effects.  Approximate “load curves” may be incorporated as well as 
contingency constraints, losses and/or reactive power flows, and short-term 
commitment issues.  The non-convex bilevel models will be convexified for solution 
via direct integer-programming techniques. 
 
B) Algorithms: Optimal branch-and-bound solutions must be compared to heuristically obtained 
solutions; “dynamic penalties” will be investigated in convexified models; and non-
heuristic decomposition algorithms for bilevel interdiction will be designed and 
tested.  
 
C) Data: Additional benchmark test-system data are required, such as the test beds available 
from the websites http://www.cesac.howard.edu and http://www.usna.edu/EPNES . 
We are attempting to obtain (disguised) data for real-world power grids in the US, 
will investigate intelligence reports on terrorist methods and resources, and will 
identify potential protective measures and their costs.  
 
D) Extensions: The bilevel interdiction model will be extended to a trilevel “protection model” 
that explicitly models potential system upgrades for better security.  It will also 
incorporate the market benefits of such upgrades to offset the cost of upgrades.  Of 
course, algorithms will be developed to solve these models. 
 
We describe some of this future work in more detail, next. 
 
6.2 Functionality and Modeling 
 
We realize that our current model’s static representation of power disruption at a given point in 
time does not fully represent the consequences of a terrorist attack.  The inaccuracy of this 
approximation depends on two major factors:  
1) Variability in the repair times of damaged system components, and to a lesser degree, 
2) Daily and weekly variability in demand. 
 
The two interdiction plans A and B (shown in Figures 2 and 3, respectively) demonstrate the first 
factor.  Plan A (attacking the substation and three selected lines) results in less instantaneous 
load-shedding than Plan B (attacking six selected lines).  However, can the latter be considered 
the worst-case scenario?  In order to answer this question, we must estimate the total amount of 
unsupplied energy while the effects of the attack last.  This entails establishing time lines, or 
“time regimes,” for repair, and evaluating the resulting load-shedding patterns, or their cost, over 
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where P is a diagonal matrix of penalties which represent upper bounds on dual variables 
[Morton and Wood 1999].  The inner minimization is now a concave problem in δ and can be 
readily solved:  The model can be converted to a mixed-integer program and solved directly, if it 
is not too large.  (Note:  The conversion just described is typically referred to as 
“convexification,” although it is actually “concavification” in this case.) 
 
However, the penalties represented by P are not easy to define in this complicated power-flow 
situation: If they are too large the model will be difficult to solve; and if they are too small, an 
incorrect solution will obtained, perhaps with no indication that it is incorrect [Israeli and Wood 
2002].  We will pursue the topic of “dynamic penalties” where small initial penalties are defined 




Our current and future interdiction models and algorithms must be tested using data derived from 
real-world systems.  An important effort must be devoted to obtaining such data from our 
contacts in the electrical power industry and to carrying out this testing.  We realize that this task 
may not be easy, and anticipate that many utilities will be reluctant to provide this information if 
our work is ultimately going to be disclosed publicly.  Initial discussion with representatives of 





In addition to physical data of real systems in the US, we need to collect information on plausible 
terrorist attacks, as well as initiate our research on protective systems by identifying and 
gathering data on actions that can be taken to increase security (e.g., maintaining spare 
transformers, hardening substations, etc.) and their costs.  
 
Learning the best way to attack electric grids allows us to better analyze how to defend them.  
However, the first difficulty here is to determine a realistic set of protective measures, or 
“measure types” for consideration, from which our optimization analysis can recommend a 
specific of actions to undertake.  
 





















In the above model, p P∈  represents the set of feasible protective measures, whose cost is 
represented by d.  Accordingly, terrorist will determine their strategy, ( )pδ ∈ ∆ , and the 
(improved) electric system will calculate optimal power flows and load-shedding patterns after 
the attack 
 
The plausibility of implementing different protective measures depends on the extent to which 
governments, utilities and consumers are willing to bear the costs of all or part of these measures.  
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 In general, expensive protective measures are unattractive when threats are deemed low, but such 
measures may make sense from the perspective of national security.  Our ultimate goal is still to 
analyze how best to improve the grid reliability, but we must explore reasonable tradeoffs 
between security and cost. 
 
How do we make the costs of improving security more palatable?  In many parts of the United 
States today, a restructuring of the electricity industry has led to an increased role of wholesale 
markets for electricity.  An important ingredient of successful electricity markets is the 
availability of transmission to allow various generation resources to compete to sell energy.  The 
transmission capability necessary for a vibrant market is typically more than was required in the 
pre-restructured industry; however, in most jurisdictions there has been little new transmission 
construction in the last decade.  Enhanced transmission capability may be able to deliver both 
increased security under an attack scenario and also greater access by competitors under normal 
conditions.  If such benefits can be reasonably quantified, then they can be incorporated as an 
offset against the cost of transmission upgrades for security enhancement.  We plan to incorporate 
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 Appendix: Tables of Results 
 
IEEE RTS-One Area (Plan B). Total Load: 2,850 MW. Resources: 6 terrorists.  
Load Shedding: 1,373 MW 
 
Worst Shedding case: DCOPF after interdiction of: 
                                       Line: A11 
                                       Line: A18 
                                       Line: A20          (indirect interdiction) 
                                       Line: A21 
                                       Line: A25-1 
                                       Line: A25-2        (indirect interdiction) 
                                       Line: A27 
                                       Line: A33-1        (indirect interdiction) 
                                       Line: A33-2 
 
Bus    Phase  Gen.   Gen.   Load   Load   Gen.   Shed   Line  Flow   Flow   Line  Flow   Flow 
name   angle  name   (MW)   met    shed   ($/h)  ($/h)  name  from   (MW)   name   to    (MW) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
101     -2.07 (All)     192    108      0   6632      0 
              101U20-    20                 2100 
              101U20-    20                 2100 
              101U76-    76                 1216 
              101U76-    76                 1216 
                                                        (All flow in)    52 
                                                        A1    102        52 
                                                                            (All flow out)  136 
                                                                            A2    103         7 
                                                                            A3    105       128 
 
102     -1.63 (All)     192     28     69   6632  69000 
              102U20-    20                 2100 
              102U20-    20                 2100 
              102U76-    76                 1216 
              102U76-    76                 1216 
                                                        (All flow in)     0 
                                                                            (All flow out)  164 
                                                                            A1    101        52 
                                                                            A4    104        46 
                                                                            A5    106        66 
 
103     -3.03 (All)       0      0    180      0 180000 
                                                        (All flow in)    70 
                                                        A2    101         7 
                                                        A7    124        63 
                                                                            (All flow out)   70 
                                                                            A6    109        70 
 
104     -5.22 (All)       0      0     74      0  74000 
                                                        (All flow in)    46 
                                                        A4    102        46 
                                                                            (All flow out)   46 
                                                                            A8    109        46 
 
105     -8.74 (All)       0     71      0      0      0 
                                                        (All flow in)   128 
                                                        A3    101       128 
                                                                            (All flow out)   57 
                                                                            A9    110        57 
 
106     -9.39 (All)       0      0    136      0 136000 
                                                        (All flow in)    66 
                                                        A5    102        66 
                                                                            (All flow out)   66 
                                                                            A10   110        66 
 
107      0.00 (All)     125    125      0   6875      0 
              107U100    80                 4400 
              107U100     0                    0 
              107U100    45                 2475 
                                                        (All flow in)     0 
                                                                            (All flow out)    0 
 
108    -18.62 (All)       0    171      0      0      0 
                                                        (All flow in)   171 
                                                        A12-1 109       104 
                                                        A13-2 110        67 
                                                                            (All flow out)    0 
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109     -8.16 (All)       0      0    175      0 175000 
                                                        (All flow in)   142 
                                                        A6    103        70 
                                                        A8    104        46 
                                                        A14   111        25 
                                                                            (All flow out)  142 
                                                                            A12-1 108       104 
                                                                            A15   112        38 
 
110    -11.82 (All)       0    195      0      0      0 
                                                        (All flow in)   262 
                                                        A9    105        57 
                                                        A10   106        66 
                                                        A16   111       101 
                                                        A17   112        38 
                                                                            (All flow out)   67 
                                                                            A13-2 108        67 
 
111     -6.96 (All)       0      0      0      0      0 
                                                        (All flow in)   126 
                                                        A19   114       126 
                                                                            (All flow out)  126 
                                                                            A14   109        25 
                                                                            A16   110       101 
 
112     -9.99 (All)       0      0      0      0      0 
                                                        (All flow in)    38 
                                                        A15   109        38 
                                                                            (All flow out)   38 
                                                                            A17   110        38 
 
113      0.00 (All)       0    265      0      0      0 
              113U197     0                    0 
              113U197     0                    0 
              113U197     0                    0 
                                                        (All flow in)   265 
                                                        A22   123       265 
                                                                            (All flow out)    0 
 
114     -3.88 (All)       0      0    194      0 194000 
              114SC       0                    0 
                                                        (All flow in)   126 
                                                        A23   116       126 
                                                                            (All flow out)  126 
                                                                            A19   111       126 
 
115      1.91 (All)     215      0    317   5915 317000 
              115U12-    12                  780 
              115U12-    12                  780 
              115U12-    12                  780 
              115U12-    12                  780 
              115U12-    12                  780 
              115U155   155                 2015 
                                                        (All flow in)     0 
                                                                            (All flow out)  215 
                                                                            A24   116       152 
                                                                            A26   124        63 
 
116      0.41 (All)     155      0    100   2015 100000 
              116U155   155                 2015 
                                                        (All flow in)   152 
                                                        A24   115       152 
                                                                            (All flow out)  307 
                                                                            A23   114       126 
                                                                            A28   119       181 
 
117      1.01 (All)       0      0      0      0      0 
                                                        (All flow in)   124 
                                                        A30   122       124 
                                                                            (All flow out)  124 
                                                                            A29   118       124 
 
118      0.00 (All)       0    333      0      0      0 
              118U400     0                    0 
                                                        (All flow in)   333 
                                                        A29   117       124 
                                                        A31-1 121       105 
                                                        A31-2 121       105 
                                                                            (All flow out)    0 
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 119     -2.02 (All)       0    181      0      0      0 
                                                        (All flow in)   181 
                                                        A28   116       181 
                                                                            (All flow out)    0 
 
120     -2.02 (All)       0      0    128      0 128000 
                                                        (All flow in)     0 
                                                                            (All flow out)    0 
 
121      1.58 (All)      33      0      0    231      0 
              121U400    33                  231 
                                                        (All flow in)   176 
                                                        A34   122       176 
                                                                            (All flow out)  209 
                                                                            A31-1 118       105 
                                                                            A31-2 118       105 
 
122      8.58 (All)     300      0      0    150      0 
              122U50-    50                   25 
              122U50-    50                   25 
              122U50-    50                   25 
              122U50-    50                   25 
              122U50-    50                   25 
              122U50-    50                   25 
                                                        (All flow in)     0 
                                                                            (All flow out)  300 
                                                                            A30   117       124 
                                                                            A34   121       176 
 
123     13.42 (All)     265      0      0   3445      0 
              123U155   110                 1430 
              123U155   155                 2015 
              123U350     0                    0 
                                                        (All flow in)     0 
                                                                            (All flow out)  265 
                                                                            A22   113       265 
 
124      0.00 (All)       0      0      0      0      0 
                                                        (All flow in)    63 
                                                        A26   115        63 
                                                                            (All flow out)   63 




otals:       Gen.     1477   1477   1373  31895 1.4E+6 flow in        2522 flow out       2522 
 
IEEE RTS-Two Areas. Total Load: 5,700 MW. Resources: 12 terrorists.  
Load Shedding: 2,516 MW 
Worst Shedding case: DCOPF after interdiction of: 
                                       Line: A18          (indirect interdiction) 
                                       Line: A20 
                                       Line: A21 
                                       Line: A25-1 
                                       Line: A25-2        (indirect interdiction) 
                                       Line: A27 
                                       Line: A33-1 
                                       Line: A33-2        (indirect interdiction) 
                                       Line: B18          (indirect interdiction) 
                                       Line: B20 
                                       Line: B21 
                                       Line: B25-1        (indirect interdiction) 
                                       Line: B25-2 
                                       Line: B27 
                                       Line: B30 
                                       Line: B33-1 
                                       Line: B33-2        (indirect interdiction) 
                                       Line: B34          (indirect interdiction) 
                                       Line: AB2 
 
Bus    Phase  Gen.   Gen.   Load   Load   Gen.   Shed   Line  Flow   Flow   Line  Flow   Flow 
name   angle  name   (MW)   met    shed   ($/h)  ($/h)  name  from   (MW)   name   to    (MW) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
101      1.76 (All)     192      0    108   6632 108000 
              101U20-    20                 2100 
              101U20-    20                 2100 
              101U76-    76                 1216 
              101U76-    76                 1216 
                                                        (All inflow)      8 
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                                                         A1    102         8 
                                                                            (All outflow)   200 
                                                                            A2    103        87 
                                                                            A3    105       113 
 
102      1.83 (All)     192      0     97   6632  97000 
              102U20-    20                 2100 
              102U20-    20                 2100 
              102U76-    76                 1216 
              102U76-    76                 1216 
                                                        (All inflow)      0 
                                                                            (All outflow)   192 
                                                                            A1    101         8 
                                                                            A4    104       116 
                                                                            A5    106        68 
 
103     -9.46 (All)       0      0    180      0 180000 
                                                        (All inflow)     87 
                                                        A2    101        87 
                                                                            (All outflow)    87 
                                                                            A6    109         5 
                                                                            A7    124        82 
 
104     -7.15 (All)       0     74      0      0      0 
                                                        (All inflow)    116 
                                                        A4    102       116 
                                                                            (All outflow)    42 
                                                                            A8    109        42 
 
105     -4.11 (All)       0     71      0      0      0 
                                                        (All inflow)    113 
                                                        A3    101       113 
                                                                            (All outflow)    42 
                                                                            A9    110        42 
 
106     -6.21 (All)       0     64     72      0  72000 
                                                        (All inflow)     68 
                                                        A5    102        68 
                                                                            (All outflow)     4 
                                                                            A10   110         4 
 
107      7.29 (All)     240      0    125  13200 125000 
              107U100    80                 4400 
              107U100    80                 4400 
              107U100    80                 4400 
                                                        (All inflow)      0 
                                                                            (All outflow)   240 
                                                                            A11   108       175 
                                                                            AB1   203        65 
 
108      0.75 (All)       0      0    171      0 171000 
                                                        (All inflow)    175 
                                                        A11   107       175 
                                                                            (All outflow)   175 
                                                                            A12-1 109       104 
                                                                            A13-2 110        71 
 
109     -9.79 (All)       0    175      0      0      0 
                                                        (All inflow)    186 
                                                        A6    103         5 
                                                        A8    104        42 
                                                        A12-1 108       104 
                                                        A15   112        35 
                                                                            (All outflow)    11 
                                                                            A14   111        11 
 
110     -6.38 (All)       0      0    195      0 195000 
                                                        (All inflow)    117 
                                                        A9    105        42 
                                                        A10   106         4 
                                                        A13-2 108        71 
                                                                            (All outflow)   117 
                                                                            A16   111        82 
                                                                            A17   112        35 
 
111    -10.31 (All)       0      0      0      0      0 
                                                        (All inflow)     93 
                                                        A14   109        11 
                                                        A16   110        82 
                                                                            (All outflow)    93 
                                                                            A19   114        93 
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112     -8.08 (All)       0      0      0      0      0 
                                                        (All inflow)     35 
                                                        A17   110        35 
                                                                            (All outflow)    35 
                                                                            A15   109        35 
 
113      0.00 (All)       0    265      0      0      0 
              113U197     0                    0 
              113U197     0                    0 
              113U197     0                    0 
                                                        (All inflow)    265 
                                                        A22   123       265 
                                                                            (All outflow)     0 
 
114    -12.58 (All)       0      0    194      0 194000 
              114SC       0                    0 
                                                        (All inflow)     93 
                                                        A19   111        93 
                                                                            (All outflow)    93 
                                                                            A23   116        93 
 
115    -15.92 (All)     215    317      0   5915      0 
              115U12-    12                  780 
              115U12-    12                  780 
              115U12-    12                  780 
              115U12-    12                  780 
              115U12-    12                  780 
              115U155   155                 2015 
                                                        (All inflow)    102 
                                                        A24   116        20 
                                                        A26   124        82 
                                                                            (All outflow)     0 
 
116    -15.73 (All)     155    100      0   2015      0 
              116U155   155                 2015 
                                                        (All inflow)     93 
                                                        A23   114        93 
                                                                            (All outflow)   148 
                                                                            A24   115        20 
                                                                            A28   119       128 
 
117      0.99 (All)       0      0      0      0      0 
                                                        (All inflow)    121 
                                                        A30   122       121 
                                                                            (All outflow)   121 
                                                                            A29   118       121 
 
118      0.00 (All)      33    333      0    231      0 
              118U400    33                  231 
                                                        (All inflow)    300 
                                                        A29   117       121 
                                                        A31-1 121        89 
                                                        A31-2 121        89 
                                                                            (All outflow)     0 
 
119    -17.45 (All)       0      0    181      0 181000 
                                                        (All inflow)    128 
                                                        A28   116       128 
                                                                            (All outflow)   128 
                                                                            A32-1 120        64 
                                                                            A32-2 120        64 
 
120    -18.93 (All)       0    128      0      0      0 
                                                        (All inflow)    128 
                                                        A32-1 119        64 
                                                        A32-2 119        64 
                                                                            (All outflow)     0 
 
121      1.35 (All)       0      0      0      0      0 
              121U400     0                    0 
                                                        (All inflow)    179 
                                                        A34   122       179 
                                                                            (All outflow)   179 
                                                                            A31-1 118        89 
                                                                            A31-2 118        89 
 
122      8.43 (All)     300      0      0    150      0 
              122U50-    50                   25 
              122U50-    50                   25 
              122U50-    50                   25 
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               122U50-    50                   25 
              122U50-    50                   25 
              122U50-    50                   25 
                                                        (All inflow)      0 
                                                                            (All outflow)   300 
                                                                            A30   117       121 
                                                                            A34   121       179 
 
123     13.42 (All)       0      0      0      0      0 
              123U155     0                    0 
              123U155     0                    0 
              123U350     0                    0 
                                                        (All inflow)    265 
                                                        AB3   217       265 
                                                                            (All outflow)   265 
                                                                            A22   113       265 
 
124    -13.43 (All)       0      0      0      0      0 
                                                        (All inflow)     82 
                                                        A7    103        82 
                                                                            (All outflow)    82 
                                                                            A26   115        82 
 
201      2.94 (All)     192      0    108   6632 108000 
              201U20-    20                 2100 
              201U20-    20                 2100 
              201U76-    76                 1216 
              201U76-    76                 1216 
                                                        (All inflow)      0 
                                                                            (All outflow)   192 
                                                                            B1    202        77 
                                                                            B2    203        16 
                                                                            B3    205        99 
 
202      2.29 (All)     192     97      0   6632      0 
              202U20-    20                 2100 
              202U20-    20                 2100 
              202U76-    76                 1216 
              202U76-    76                 1216 
                                                        (All inflow)     77 
                                                        B1    201        77 
                                                                            (All outflow)   172 
                                                                            B4    204        76 
                                                                            B5    206        96 
 
203      0.88 (All)       0      0    180      0 180000 
                                                        (All inflow)     81 
                                                        B2    201        16 
                                                        AB1   107        65 
                                                                            (All outflow)    81 
                                                                            B6    209        63 
                                                                            B7    224        18 
 
204     -3.58 (All)       0     74      0      0      0 
                                                        (All inflow)     76 
                                                        B4    202        76 
                                                                            (All outflow)     2 
                                                                            B8    209         2 
 
205     -2.21 (All)       0      0     71      0  71000 
                                                        (All inflow)     99 
                                                        B3    201        99 
                                                                            (All outflow)    99 
                                                                            B9    210        99 
 
206     -9.02 (All)       0    136      0      0      0 
                                                        (All inflow)    136 
                                                        B5    202        96 
                                                        B10   210        40 
                                                                            (All outflow)     0 
 
207     -1.32 (All)     240    125      0  13200      0 
              207U100    80                 4400 
              207U100    80                 4400 
              207U100    80                 4400 
                                                        (All inflow)      0 
                                                                            (All outflow)   115 
                                                                            B11   208       115 
 
208     -5.62 (All)       0    115     56      0  56000 
                                                        (All inflow)    134 
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                                                         B11   207       115 
                                                        B12-1 209        19 
                                                                            (All outflow)    19 
                                                                            B13-2 210        19 
 
209     -3.68 (All)       0      0    175      0 175000 
                                                        (All inflow)     64 
                                                        B6    203        63 
                                                        B8    204         2 
                                                                            (All outflow)    64 
                                                                            B12-1 208        19 
                                                                            B14   211         5 
                                                                            B15   212        40 
 
210     -7.56 (All)       0    195      0      0      0 
                                                        (All inflow)    235 
                                                        B9    205        99 
                                                        B13-2 208        19 
                                                        B16   211        76 
                                                        B17   212        40 
                                                                            (All outflow)    40 
                                                                            B10   206        40 
 
211     -3.90 (All)       0      0      0      0      0 
                                                        (All inflow)     76 
                                                        B14   209         5 
                                                        B19   214        71 
                                                                            (All outflow)    76 
                                                                            B16   210        76 
 
212     -5.62 (All)       0      0      0      0      0 
                                                        (All inflow)     40 
                                                        B15   209        40 
                                                                            (All outflow)    40 
                                                                            B17   210        40 
 
213    -13.42 (All)       0    265      0      0      0 
              213U197     0                    0 
              213U197     0                    0 
              213U197     0                    0 
                                                        (All inflow)    265 
                                                        B22   223       265 
                                                                            (All outflow)     0 
 
214     -2.16 (All)       0      0    194      0 194000 
              214SC       0                    0 
                                                        (All inflow)     71 
                                                        B23   216        71 
                                                                            (All outflow)    71 
                                                                            B19   211        71 
 
215     -0.56 (All)     215    317      0   5915      0 
              215U12-    12                  780 
              215U12-    12                  780 
              215U12-    12                  780 
              215U12-    12                  780 
              215U12-    12                  780 
              215U155   155                 2015 
                                                        (All inflow)    102 
                                                        B24   216        84 
                                                        B26   224        18 
                                                                            (All outflow)     0 
 
216      0.27 (All)     155      0    100   2015 100000 
              216U155   155                 2015 
                                                        (All inflow)      0 
                                                                            (All outflow)   155 
                                                                            B23   214        71 
                                                                            B24   215        84 
 
217     24.86 (All)       0      0      0      0      0 
                                                        (All inflow)    265 
                                                        B29   218       265 
                                                                            (All outflow)   265 
                                                                            AB3   123       265 
 
218     27.03 (All)     198    333      0   1386      0 
              218U400   198                 1386 
                                                        (All inflow)    400 
                                                        B31-1 221       200 
                                                        B31-2 221       200 
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                                                                             (All outflow)   265 
                                                                            B29   217       265 
 
219      0.27 (All)       0      0    181      0 181000 
                                                        (All inflow)      0 
                                                                            (All outflow)     0 
 
220      0.27 (All)       0      0    128      0 128000 
                                                        (All inflow)      0 
                                                                            (All outflow)     0 
 
221     30.05 (All)     400      0      0   2800      0 
              221U400   400                 2800 
                                                        (All inflow)      0 
                                                                            (All outflow)   400 
                                                                            B31-1 218       200 
                                                                            B31-2 218       200 
 
222      0.00 (All)       0      0      0      0      0 
              222U50-     0                    0 
              222U50-     0                    0 
              222U50-     0                    0 
              222U50-     0                    0 
              222U50-     0                    0 
              222U50-     0                    0 
                                                        (All inflow)      0 
                                                                            (All outflow)     0 
 
223      0.00 (All)     265      0      0   3445      0 
              223U155   110                 1430 
              223U155   155                 2015 
              223U350     0                    0 
                                                        (All inflow)      0 
                                                                            (All outflow)   265 
                                                                            B22   213       265 
 
224      0.00 (All)       0      0      0      0      0 
                                                        (All inflow)     18 
                                                        B7    203        18 
                                                                            (All outflow)    18 
                                                                            B26   215        18 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Totals:       Gen.     3184   3184   2516  76800 2.5E+6 Inflow         4893 Outflow        4893 
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